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U.S. Antidumping Policies: The Case of Steel
ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines the controversy surrounding recent allegations
that foreign producers are dumping steel products onto U.S. markets. The
paper is in four sections, which take four quite distinct views of dumping
andrecent U.S. antidumping policies, emphasizing the changing definition
of dumping and the development of administrative procedures. Section II
focuses on the application of these procedures to the international steel
trade, taking as a case study the most noteworthy of recent innovations:
the Trigger Price Mechanism for steel. Section III considers models that
can be used to analyze dumping. The models of most relevance to the prac-
tices currently at issue in the steel industry seem to us models of oligo—
polistic rivalry in imperfectly competitive, segmented markets. We develop
a model designed to identify crucial factors upon which the incidence of
dumping will depend: the number of firms producing for each national market,
their costs, their market shares, and the extent to which they recognize
and exploit their mutual dependence. Finally, in Section IV we calibrate
these models to illustrate how the extent of dumping and the effects of the
TPM depend on the model's parameters.
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(617) 868—3983Few aspects of international economic relations are as contentious as
the allegation of dumping and the enforcement of antidumping statutes.
Recently, attention has been focused on allegations by U.S. producers of foreign
violations of U.S. trade law, most notably in the steel sector. Thecontroversy
surrounding these allegations clearly has focused the attention of foreign
governments, which have threatened to retaliate against the United States if
antidumping duties are assessed. To defuse a potentially explosive situation,
the U.S. has experimented with a new form of administeredprotection, the
Trigger Price Mechanism for steel, and made several formal and informalattempts
to negotiate orderly marceting arrangements with foreign governments andprodu-
cers.
Dumpingcomplaints certainly are not limited to steel. Indeed,recent
allegations are notable for their catholicity: in the U.S. alone, dumping
complaints have ranged from trade in basic agricultural commodities to sophisti-
cated high technolor products, encompassing exports fromdeveloped and deve-
loping countries alike. Neither are dumping allegations new; by now such
complaints have been prevalent in the international steel trade for more than a
century. However, not since the 1920s, in the environment of mutual suspicion
and costly structural adjustment that followed the First WorldWar, have these
allegations been so widespread. Indeed, dumping complaints and the use of anti—
dumping policies to protect industries claiming injury from "unfair competition"
are prototypical of the "new protectionism" of the post—Bretton Woods era. In
contrast to the operation of traditional trade restrictions, which typically
entails the imposition of specific or ad valorem tariffs at well—defined rates
or quotas at well—defined levels, the new protectionism is characterized by
trade restrictions administered on a contingent basis bycomplex bureaucracies—2—
exercising a considerable degree of discretion. Antidumping duties generally,
and the Trigger Price Mechanism in particular, can be seen as instances of this
phenomenon.
-
Inpart, recent interest in U.S. antidumping policy has been stimulated
by changes in the popular connotation attached to the term "dumping." Under the
provisions of the U.S. Antiduinping Act of 1921, the primary definition of
dumping was export sales at a price below that of sales in the home market.
Following Viner (1923), economIsts generally adhered to this criterion, defining
dumping as price discrimination between national markets and explaining it with
familiar theories of monopolistic behavior. This definition encompasses both
the standard case of export prices below domestic prices and the opposite
configuration, known as "reverse dumping." However, the 1921 AntiduinpingAct
also included a provision to be invoked in the absence of comparable sales in
foreign markets. In such instances, dumping was said to occur when export
prices failed to cover a statutory measure of foreign producers' production
costs. Nearly half a century ago, Haberler (1937) noted that this "rival" defi-
nition had gained considerable currency. The 1974 U.S. Trade Act and 1979 Trade
Agreements Act further broadened the applicability of these constructed value
provisions. As dumping allegations increasingly have come to revolve around the
relation of prices to production costs, the literature has extended beyond
reasons for price discrimination to encompass also the motivation for sales at
prices that fail to cover costs (e.g., Ethier [1982], Davies and McGuinness
[1982]).
In this paper, we analyze dumping from both theoretical and empirical
viewpoints.1 The paper is in four sections, which takefourquite distinct
views of dumping and recent U.S. antidumping policies. Section I describes the—3—
evolution of U.S. antidumping policies, emphasizing the changing definition of
dumping and the development of administrative procedures. Section II focuses on
the application of these procedures to the international steel trade, taking as
a case study the most noteworthy of recent innovations: the Trigger Price
Mechanism (TPN). We analyze the administrative and procedural conventions that
caused the TPM to be attractive in the first place but contributed ultimately to
its demise, and we examine its economic effects. Given recent events, this ana-
lysis has the appearance of an extended postmortem, but we think it serves an
important function in illuminating some general principles about the effects of
administered protection.
Section III formulates a model that can be used to analyze dumping. We
discuss both the "traditional" definition of dumping as price discrimination
amongnational markets and the "modern" definition of du.mping as pricing below
costs. Evidence presented below indicates the presence of substantial price
discrimination persisting for extended periods inmarketsfor steel products
suchas cold rolled sheet and concrete reinforcing bars. For this and other
reasons, in our theoretical and empirical analyses, we concentrate on the tradi-
tional definition of dumping as price discrimination in international trade.
Section IV of the paper calibrates the model and uses it to illustrate how the
extent of dumping and the TPM's effects depend on the model's parameters. The
final section presents some concluding remarks.
I. The Evolution of U.S. Antidumping Policies
Current U.S. antidwuping statutes can be traced to the Antidumping
Act of 1921.2 The avowed purpose of the 1921 Act was to deter predatory pricing
in international trade in order to prevent foreign monopolization of domestic
ma&ets.3 Its provisions, as incorporated into the 1930 Tariff, remained little—4—
changed until the 1950's. The Secretary of the Treasury was to investigate
dumping complaints by comparing U.S. import prices with the "fair value" of
imports. Upon finding that fair value exceeded U.S. import prices, Treasury was
to calculate the difference, known as the dumping margin, and finding evidence
of material injury to U.S. producers to assess an antidumping duty. Measurement
of U.S. import prices was straightforward: the FOB factory sales price could be
used except when the transaction between foreign supplier and U.S. purchaser was
not at arm's length, in which case U.S. market price,netof import charges and
costs of transportation and preparation for the market,could be substituted.
Fromthe law's inception, the calculation of fair value was ambiguous, since the
concept was not defined by statute. From 1921 through 1954, Treasury used as a
standard for fair value a commodity's foreign market value or, in its absence,
constructed value. Foreign market value was a transactions price, preferably
observed in the exporter's home market but otherwise in third markets.
Constructed value was a complex measure made up of allowances for production
costs, costs of preparing the good for shipment, and statutory minima for
general expenses and profits.
Before 1955, Treasury calculations of fair value and foreign market
value rarely proved problematic. Most dumping cases simply were disposed of on
the grounds that injury was absent or on the acceptance of price assurances. In
1954, however, an amendment to the Antidumping Act assigned responsibility for
determining injury to the Tariff Commission and instructed that injury decisions
be deferred pending the Treasury ruling that dumping was present, thereby sub-
jecting the Treasury decision to public scrutiny. In addition, the growth of
trade with centrally-planned economies for which market prices were not readily
observed increased Treasury's reliance on constructed value. Repeatedly,—5—
Treasurywas forced to revise its procedures as new complications arose. On
several occasions between 1958 and 1974, antidumping regulations were modified
to bring them into conformance with established practice.
The amendments to the Antidu.mping Act contained in the Trade Act of
1974 culminated this process of revision. Of greatest consequence was Section
205(b), which defined new circumstances under which the constructed value cri-
terion could be substituted for foreign maitet value.4 In instances where
sales "over an extended period of time and in substantial quantities" were made
in the foreign producer's home market at prices below costs of production,
those foreign inaitet prices were to be disregarded and constructed value calcu—
].ations were to be substituted. Ispite ambiguity about the meaning of "an
extended period" and "substantial quantities," this revision of the law repre-
sented a significant shift in the design of U.S. antidumping policies from an
emphasis on dumping as price discrimination to an emphasis on dumping as sales
below cost.
The economic effects of the constructed value provisions in U.S.
antiduinping statutes have been the subject of considerable recent discussion.5
According to U.S. antidu.mping law, constructed value should be a guide to prices
which permit the recovery of raw material and fabrication costs, plus a ten per
cent minimum allowance for general expenses and an eight per cent minimum
allowance for profits.6 Other than the "extended period" clause, the Act makes
no provision for the profit margin to vary over the business cycle. Thus, the
law makes it difficult for firms to cut prices when market conditions are unfa-
vorable and increases the likelihood that marginal cost pricing during
recessions will be construed as dumping. Moreover, the eight per cent profit
allowance, which makes no provision for variations in corporate finance,—6—
requires a higher return on equity for firms with higher debt-equity ratios, and
the ten per cent allowance for general expenses makes no provision for
variations in cost structure.
These provisions provided a considerable incentive for U.S. producers
to file antidumping suits. In the case of the steel industry, other factors
also contributed to the growing incidence of dumping complaints. The United
States had been a net importer of steel products since 1959, and by 1968 the
import share of the U.S. maiket had risen to nearly 17 per cent. In 1969 the
first of two successive voluntary restraint agreements with the European
Community and Japan went into effect. When the second of these agreements
expired in 1974, coincident with the end of the 1972—74 steel mazket boom, U.S.
producers pressed with growing vigor for further voluntary restraints, but
without success.7 From 1975 through 1977, the industry's position worsened:
three consecutive years of exceptionally low shipments by domestic producers
culminated in a serious profit squeeze. In 1977, the Carter Administration
suggested that the U.S. steel industry drop its campaign for quantitative import
restrictions in return for strict enforcement of the provisions of the 1974
Trade Act providing protection from unfair foreign competition. As the pro-
ceedings of the Gilmore case, filed in early 1977, seemed to indicate, this
approach was highly promising. When the industry initiated 23 dumping
complaints, the European Community threatened to retaliate against the U.S.,
while Treasury and the ITC were confronted by the difficulty of processing the
petitions within required time limits.
The Administration had already established a Treasury task force to
study the problem. Its recommendations included a reference price system to
facilitate rapid initiation of steel dumping complaints.8 In the event that—7-
steel was imported at a price below reference prices basedupon the constructed
value of Japanese steel (Japan being assumed the world's most efficient
producer), a Treasury dumping investigation automatically would be triggered.
Hence the term "Trigger Price Mechanism." Claiming insufficient resources both
to administer the TPM and to investigate independent dumping complaints,
Treasury warned the industry that the TPM would be maintained only so long as
producersrefrained from filing antidumping petitions. Eventually, the steel
industry complied and withdrew most of itscomplaints.
TheTrade Agreements Act of 1979 represented an attempt to limit the
discretion of administrative authorities, to enhance the prospect of relief for
petitioners, and to strengthen opportunities for judicial review. Title I of
the 1979 Act replaced the Antidumping Act of 1921. Its centralprovisions shor-
tened the time limits within which an antidumping determination must be reached.
Under the new law, the preliminary determination of less than fair value sales
must come within 140 or 190 days of the initiation of an investigation,
depending on a case's complexity. This compares with 180 or 270 days underpre-
vious law. In exceptional circumstances, the preliminary determination nowmay
be announced within 90 days.9
In addition to these changes, the 1979 Act marks the continued ascen-
dancy of the constructed value criterion. Previously, when price comparisons
with the exporters' home market were appropriate but impossible, the authorities
were permitted to use constructed value only when price comparisons with third
country markets were infeasible. Under the 1979 Act, they are allowed further
discretion in the use of either third country or constructed valuecomparisons.
Although Treasury initially was instructed to continue its use of third market
comparisons wherever possible, Commerce now has the option of using constructed-8-
value not just when there is evidence that sales fail to cover costs "over an
extended period of time and in substantial quantities," but whenever necessary
to meet the shortened time limits.10 Even the possibility that constructed value
calculations might be substituted for third market comparisons has elicitied
objections from U.S. importers and foreign producers.1 1
Once again, the modifications in the new Act provided an inducement to
file antidurnping petitions. In March of 1980, the U.S. Steel Corporation filed
a major dumping complaint against European producers, leading to the suspension
of the TPM. This and subsequent petitions eventually were withdrawn after a new
set of trigger prices was adopted in October. However, this second
understanding was even less durable than the first. In January 1982, the steel
industry lodged a new round of 132 complaints under the provisions of both coun-
tervailing duty and antidumping statutes, marking the second suspension and
apparently the demise of the TPM.
In summary, the evolution of U.S. antidu.rnping policies can be seen as a
response to economic and administrative exigencies. As markets have grown
increasinglyintegrated, criteria and procedures for determining dumping have
been modified to expedite the decision—making process. Statutory and procedural
changes have ledto growing dependence on the constructed value criterion for
dumping. Thssatisfaction with earlier procedures has provided the impetus to
reduce the discretion of administrative agencies and to place greater reliance
on legalistic procedures, leaving less room for negotiated solutions and
encouraging the emergence of adversarial relationships. The Trigger Price
Mechanism provides a clear illustration of these phenomena.
II. The Trigger Price Mechanism
The TPM was based on the following principles:(1) Treasury was to—9—
calculate for each product the average cost of production in Japan, which was
taken as the world's most efficient producer. (2) Customs was to collect and
analyze data on production costs and prices in major steel—exporting countries
and to monitor imports by means of a Special Invoice for steel products,
alerting Treasury of substantial or repeated shipments below trigger prices.
(3) In such instances, Treasury was to initiate an antidumping investigation
without waiting to receive a complaint.(4) While officially the TPM did not
prevent domestic producers from exercising their rights under U.S. trade law, in
fact the TPM was based on an understanding that existing dumping complaints
would be dropped and no major new ones would be initiated.(5) Equally, the TPN
did not prevent foreign producers from exercising their rights under U.S. anti—
dumping statutes. Preclearance (assurance that exports under trigger price
levels would not lead to the initiation of antidumping procedures) would be
granted if they demonstrated that prices were not below fair value.(6) If
sales at less than fair value were found and injury was established, counter-
vailing duties were imposed on all shipments of the product by the offending
producer. The level of the duty was determined by the difference between either
foreign market price or constructed value and U.S. market price; that is,
without reference to trigger prices.
The trigger price for each product was made up of three components: a
"base price" for each product category, "extras," and transportcharges. The
base price reflected estimates of average cost of production in Japan.
Treasury, and later Commerce, based their average cost estimates on confidential
data supplied by MITI. To base prices, "extras" were added to account for addi-
tional costs associated with specifications for width, thickness, ôhemistry or
surface preparation which differed from the base product. To these figures were-10-
added transport costs, including charges for Japanese inland freight, loading,
ocean freight, insurance and wharfage. These charges differed for East Coast,
Gulf Coast, Pacific Coast and Great Lakes shipments. Importer's sales com-
missions were excluded, since trigger prices were based on cost to importers,
assuming that transactions were at arm's—length. If the importer was related to
the exporter of the steelmill product and the transfer price did not reflect an
arm's—length transaction, then the first sales price by the importer to an unre-
lated U.S. buyer was compared with the trigger price.
Trigger prices were calculated in dollars per metric ton (2,205 lbs) or
net ton (2,000 lbs), with quarterly adjustments for changes in estimated produc-
tion costs, transport charges and yen-dollar exchange rates. To provide the
authorities with some discretion in light of the extent of exchange rate fluc-
tuations, a five per cent "flexibility band" was introduced to permit trigger
prices to fluctuate around landed cost estimates. With the reinstatement of the
TPM in 1980, the preclearance procedure and the exchange rate conversion factor
were altered, and an "antisurge" provision was added, setting quantitative rules
for a special review of imports in periods when steel imports were increasing
and domestic capacity utilization was low.12
A. Calculating Trigger Prices
Calculating Japanese production costs is a difficult task. (A repre-
sentative estimate is shown in Table 1.) We focus on four problematic aspects
of the cost calculation: estimating normal capacity utilization rates, adding an
allowance for profits, estimating yield ratios, and converting costs in yen into
trigger prices in dollars.
Estimates of normal capacity utilization rates mattered for calculating
Japanese costs because the fixed cost component of total costs was divided byTable 1
Estimated Japanese Cost of Production
(19811V, $/metric ton finished product)
Basic raw materials 166.60
Other raw materials 86.90
Labor 106.62
Other expenses 26.01




Source: Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration.—11—
normal capacity utilization rather than current capacity utilization in
constructing fixed costs per ton of production. For the second and third quar-
ters of 1978, cost estimates were based on an 85 per cent capacity utilization
rate, the average for Japanese facilities over the previous 20 years. In
19781V, Treasury switched to the average operating rate over the previous five
years. Given Japan's relatively low capacity utilization rates in the
mid—1970s, this change raised trigger prices by approximately $18 per net ton.13
This effect became even moresignificant asthe high capacityutilization years
1973-74leftthe five—year reference period. Capacity utilization assumptions
significantlyaffected estimated Japanese costs because not only 90 per cent of
depreciation and 75 per cent of interest expenses but 50 per cent of labor costs
and other expenses were included in fixed costs.
In accordance with U.S. trade law, under the TPM an allowance for nor-
mal profits was added to Japanese costs in the amount of eight per cent of raw
material costs, labor costs and other expenses. Like fixed costs, this
allowance was divided by normal capacity utilization rather than actual capacity
utilizationin calculating profits per ton of production. Compared to the
constructed value provision of U.S. antiduinping law, there was little tendency
forthe profit margin to rise as the level of activity declined. However, this
provision still prevented foreign firmsfromemulating their domestic com-
petitorsbyreducing their maiups and accepting lower profit margins in periods
ofstagnant demand.
The production cost data submitted by TI was based on an 86.5 per
centyield ratio (tons of finished steel per ton of crude steel). U.S. produ-
cers, whose older facilities generated lower yields, claimed that some of the
products that were regarded as finished by the Japanese were scrap by U.S.—12—
standards.Consequently, the 86.5 per cent yield was lowered to 80 per cent.
Only from 19781V, after a mission bytheSteel Task Force to Japan, was the
extentof Japanese superiority in steel processing and finishing recognized and
incorporated into higher yield ratios of 82.7 per cent and into higher yield
credits, together reducing estimated Japanese costsbyas much as $15 per net
ton.14
Whiletrigger prices were expressed in dollars, production costs, with
exception of most raw materials, were denominated in yen. Since exchange rates
were considerably more variable than production costs, initially yen were con-
verted to dollars using a 60-day average exchange rate for the period prior to
announcement of the current quarter's trigger prices. After reinstatement, this
60—day average was replaced by a 36-month moving average "to minimize the impact
of exchange rate fluctuations on TFM levels."15 This change in the exchange
ratesused to convert yen to dollars significantly affected trigger price
levels.16
Table2 illustrates the extent to which exchange rate conversion fac-
tors affected estimated Japanese production costs. For example, had Japanese
production costs been based on current exchange rates, the average base price
would have fallen from $395 in 19781V to $356 in 19791V instead of rising by
$16 over the period. Had a 36—month average been used in this period, it is
likely that the TPM would have been stillborn, because the first base price
would have been $293 instead of $328, a difference of 11 per cent.
In the first year of the TPM, the base price rose 18 per cent, not
withstanding a 2.8 per cent downward adjustment under flexibility band provi-
sions. This rise was almost exclusively attributable to appreciation of the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Notes to Table 2
1.Average exchange rate for the quarter.
2. The 60—day average was based on a period which terminated between one and
twomonths before the quarter's start. In calculating the 60—day average
exchange rate applied to a quarter, we average the exchange rate for the
first two months of the previous quarter.
3.Averageof 36 months terminating two months before the quarter's start.
4. Base prices, which are for illustrative purposes only, do not include
"extras," transport costs and importation charges.
5. Japanese production cost estimates may differ from base trigger prices due
to use of the flexibility band. A "plus" indicates an upward adjustment due
to the flexibility band.
6. For purposes of these calculations, base prices are corrected for flexibi-
lity band effects. One—third of Japanese costs are assumed to be expressed
in dollars to allow for dollar—denominated raw material imports.—13—
Tripartite Comniittee regarded it a highly successful mechanism.1? In 19791 the
yen began its steep decline which was reflected in trigger prices beginning with
197911. Rising Japanese production costs were almost entirely offset by the
higher yen/dollar exchange rate:the 19801 base price was less than two per
cent above its 19791 level. Again, it is not surprising that the U.S. industry
grew increasingly dissatisfied with the TPM's operation. The U.S. Steel Co.
filed its March 1980 antidumping suits in reaction to these develonents more
than anything else.18 Thus, exchange rate fluctuationsplay a major role in
explaining the suspension of the TPM.
Following reinstatement, the 36—month average was substituted for the
60—day average. This reduced the risk that further depreciation of the yen
would reduce base prices in the immediate future. The choice of exchange rate
conversion factor had major implications. The most extreme instance was in
19791, when the difference under the two exchange rate conversion factors was 20
per cent. If, in the first two years of the TPM, a 36-month average had been
used, Japanese production costs in dollars would have been 12 per cent lower on
average. In contrast, following the reinstatement of the TPM, the difference
under the two methods was comparatively small.
The TPM's first suspension was partly the result of the depreciation of
the yen and the strength of the dollar; its second suspension and demise were
partly a consequence of inflation in the U.S. combined with stable Japanese pro-
duction costs, in yen, and a virtually constant 36—month average exchange rate.
At the same time, fluctuations of the European currencies against the dollar and
the yen contributed to disintegration of the second stage of the TPM.
Appreciation of the yen against most European currencies increased European
producers' ability to export below trigger prices (see Table 3). Although theTable 3
ExchangeRates Under the Second Stage
of the TPM, 1980IV_1982I*
Against Yen* Against "TPN-Yen"4 Against $
Belgian Franc -18% —27% —35%
German Maik —10% —19% —23%
French Franc -18% -27% -36%
Italian Lira -20% -29% —39% BritishPound —14% -23% —29%
*Quarteraverages.
**36—monthaverage used in calculating Japanese production costs in dollars.
Aminusindicates an appreciation oftheyen.
Source:Ipartment of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Commerce
News (various issues); InternationalMonetaryFund, International
Financial Statistics (various issues).—14-
impact of these exchange rate changes was mitigated to some extent by raw
material prices quoted in dollars, it resulted in a proliferation of
preclearance requests by European producers; for example, preclearance proce-
dures on behalf of Hoogovens of the Netherlands indicated that they were in fact
capable of exporting under trigger prices without exporting below fair value.
With the realization that prospects for extensive antiduinping actions were dim,
the U.S. industry's focus shifted increasingly to the issue of foreign govern-
mental subsidization, and the TPM's days were numbered.
B. Economic Implications of the TPM
The shipping cost of Japanese exports to the U.S. differs substantially
by region (see Table 4). Since different trigger prices were calculated by
region, owing to differences in Japanese transport costs and related factors,
the system significantly distorted established trade and production patterns.
The use of Japanese transport costs in the calculation of trigger prices
reversed the traditional geographic relationship of relatively low Great Lakes
prices to relatively high West Coast prices.19 The implications for foreignpro-
ducers, other than the Japanese, depended on whether their major export maxket
was the East Coast and Great Lakes or the Gulf Coast and the West. Regional
differences in trigger prices penalized European producers whose markets were in
the East relative to those whose markets were in the West. The effects were
analogous for domestic firnis West Coast producers were penalized relative to
East Coast and Great Lakes producers, since they faced lower priced import com-
petition. Both the 30 per cent rise in imports on the Pacific Coast between
1977 and 1978, in a period when imports into the Great Lakes region were
declining by 15 per cent, and the losses experienced by Kaiser Steel, a leading
West Coast producer, in an otherwise profitable year may have reflected theseTable 4
Importation Charges on Japanese Steel Products, 1978—Il
per metric ton)
Product Freight Insurance Interest Handling Total
Hot Rolled Carbon
Bars to:
Lakes 40.83 3.49 11.18 3.63 59.13
East 28.13 3.36 8.77 3.63 43.89
Gulf 23.59 3.32 8.66 4.54 40.11
Pacific 22.69 3.31 6.68 2.72 35.40
ColdRolled Sheet to:
Lakes 31.76 2.42 7.77 3.63 45.58
East 24.50 2.34 6.14 3.63 36.61
Gulf 20.87 2.31 6.05 4.54 33.77
Pacific 20.87 2.31 4.68 2.72 30.58
Source: Treasury News, January 3, 1978.—15—
phenomena.20 Similarly, domestic steel—using industries in Ohio were put at a
disadvantage relative to their competitors in California and the Southwest.
European opposition to generous trigger prices in their major regional maitets
led Treasury to adjust downward the freight allowance to the Great Lakes, but
distortions of established trade patterns remained.
In addition to regional price differentials, the product mix of imports
was altered by the TPM. For some products, differences between trigger prices
and U.S. mill list prices were substantial, while for others they were minor.
Compare the margins (which disregard American discounting) reported in Table 5.
A comparison of trigger prices and American list prices suggests that the
trigger price-list price differential varied substantially. Foreign producers
specializing in relatively sophisticated, expensive products objected most
strenuously to large positive differentials.
Another effect was a shift by foreign producers to the sale of fabri-
cated steel products which were exempt initially from the TPM. Imports of
fabricated standard shapes were 71 per cent higher in December 1978 than in the
previous year. In contrast to large increases in the price of basic steel pro-
ducts, the prices of TPM—exempt fabricated standard shapes increased on average
by only 3.5 per cent from the previous year.21 The wire and wire rod segment of
the market provided a graphic example of incomplete coverage:the fact that
initially the TPM covered wire processors' inputs but not their outputs led them
to complain of negative effective rates of protection. Subsequent extensions of
the TPN's coverage from 65 per cent of imports initially to 85 per cent in
197911 reflected the Administration's recognition of this problem.
The establishment of a single reference price for a particular steel
product, independent of origin, affects all foreign suppliers similarly only ifTable 5
Trigger Price —U.S.List Price Differentials, 1978
Trigger Price
197811, Plus
EstimatedU.S. Steel Co. (1)—(2) U.S. Steel Co. (1)—(4)
Duties List Price in %ListPrice in %
EastCoastJanuary 1978of (i) February 1978of (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Hot—Rolled Sheet $262 $288 —9 $300 —15 Plate 301 324 —7 323 —8
Cold—Rolled Sheet 329 333 —1 358 —9
Hot—Rolled Bar 373 359 +4 345 +8
Tin Plate 500 481 +4 na na
na: not available
Source: Iron Age, January 16, 1978, p. 29.—16—
products are homogeneous. In fact, there are significant quality differences in
products which appear superficially to be homogeneous.22 Prior to theTPM,
foreign suppliers of low quality steel could use low prices to compete with
suppliers of higher quality products. This was more difficult under the TPM,
which tended, other things equal, to divert trade from suppliers of low—quality
steel to suppliers of high—quality products.
In theory, the TPM was based on prices charged by exporters to unre—
lated U.S. customers, or by related importers to subsequent unrelated customers.
However, when the exporting and importing companies were related, the proper
measure of compliance often was difficult to observe. tbmestic customers could
delegate steel purchases to a foreign branch or open an offshore trading firm to
buy foreign steel below trigger prices and export it to the U.S. above trigger
prices. Similarly, foreign producers with downstream investments in steel pro-
cessing in the U.S. could respect trigger prices in sales to U.S. subsidiaries,
merely transfering profits from the U.S. subsidiary to the foreign base without
affecting any physical transactions. The rise of related party transactions
from 40 to 60 per cent of total imports in the first year of the TPM is
suggestive of the extent of these practices.23in response, Commerce changed
its related party monitoring procedures to include an ex mill price monitoring
policy and new rules to evaluate unrelated resale prices.
Economic considerations provided importers and exporters with obvious
incentives to circumvent the Customs Bureau's policing mechanism. The indict-
ment of the Japanese trading company, Mitsui, for defrauding the United States
provides an indication of the techniques available to an importer.24 To circum-
vent the TPM and the Antidumping Act, Mitsui admitted to having reported falsely
inflated invoice prices and to having reduced actual payments by customers by—17—
arranging false contract cancellation confirmations, which entitled the customer
to cancellation penalties; by providing refunds for false damage claims, inispro—
ductions or other debit memoranda; by paying commissions to a foreign parent
companyof anAmerican customer; and by making"currencyadjustment" payments
basedona secret "yen/dollar exchange rate agreement." It also admitted to
predatingcontracts to shift the apparent sales date into the period when the
TPNwassuspended.
We have no way of estimating the prevalence of such practices, but it
is clear that insuring compliance is one of the major problems confronting
architects of schemes for administered protection such as the TPM. To
understand these problems better, it may help to look more closely at the moti-
vation for dumping itself.
III. Nodels of Dumping
Although a number of explanations for dumping, defined either as price
discrimination in international trade or as sales below costs of production, are
current in policy circles, few of these arguments have been subjected to formal
analysis. In this section, we first review the popular explanations, starting
with the "modern" definition of dumping as sales below costs of production,
before proceeding to the alternative definition of the practice as international
price discrimination. Finally, we present a theoretical model of what seems to
us a particularly important explanation for dumping in the international steel
trade: international differences in industry structure and conduct in imper-
fectly competitive, segmented markets.
Until recently, there have been few formal models of reasons why firms
may persist in exporting at prices below production costs. It is well known, of
course, that in perfectly competitive markets where firmsequateprice with-18-
marginal cost, it may be optimal to continue operating at a loss during periods
of depressed demand so long as revenues cover variable costs. However, this
does not seem to be quite what those who criticize sales below costs have in
mind. Rather, they seem to be objecting to practices which imply that firms
have departed from their cost curves and are engaged in questionable practices,
possibly predatory in nature. Ethier (1982) has presented a model in which
competitive firms not only export at prices below costs but appear to depart
from their supply curves when demand is unusually depressed. He assumes that
firms are constrained to negotiate wage contracts before the state of demand is
known, and that they are incapable of responding to a demand Bhortfall by rene-
gotiating wages. Their only option is to lay off laborers whose contracts can
be terminated. Since they are not permitted to accumulate inventories, firms
mayhave no choice but to sell output at prices below average cost when demand
is unfavorable. The unique feature of the model is that there are circumstances
in which it is optimal for firms to practice restraint in laying off woikers
even when labor's wage exceeds its marginal product. Ethier assumes that
employers and employees share knowledge of the shape of the wage—employment
tradeoffs Firms which retain some workers when demand is depressed despite the
fact that labor's wage exceeds its marginal product are able to pay lower wages,
other things being equal, when demand is buoyant. Thus, firms engage in prac-
tices that bear little resemblance to a strater of minimizing losses in the
face of fixed costs and that can be construed as predatory dumping. In fact,
they are merely acting in their preceived long—run interest, given conditions in
factor and product maxcets.
Other explanations for the persistence of pricing below apparent
variable costs are based upon dynamic considerations. In Eichengreen (1982) we—19—
analyze several dynamic models. We formalize the claim that firms dump inter-
mittently to attract other firm's loyal customers, referred to by Stegemann
(1980) as the "short—sighted buyer" argument. The firm'sproblem is formulated
in standard dynamic optimization terms, where the number of customers to whom it
cansellis a slowly adjusting variable which depends on the firm'spast pricing
policy. In response to disturbances, the firm may find it optimal to reduce
price below variable cost in order to augment its stoc of customers. At each
point in time, the firm equates current marginal cost with marginalrevenue from
current sales plus the present value of future sales to customersacquired as a
result of current pricing policy. This practice, which in factequates marginal
cost with shadow marginal revenue, resembles dumping nonetheless.
We also formalize the argument that finnsmay price below the standard
markup and perhaps below current variable cost in periods of depressed demand
due to additional costs of adjusting •the level of production.Again, the dyna-
mic optimization problem is standard, except that we includean adjustment cost
term, specified as an increasing function of the percentage change in output.
The optimal response to a permanent decline in demand isfairly intuitive. As
the unanticipated demand shortfall occurs, the firm mustsharply reduce its
price, since it is costly to cut production in response to theexogenous decline
in demand. Over time, the firm reduces production at theoptimal rate, given
adjustment costs, permitting it to increase the price charged for itsoutput.
Although the firm is simply equating marginal revenue with shadow marginal cost,
the initial price cut again resembles dumping.
Another popular dynamic argument is that dumping results from firms'
concern with the economics of learning—by—doing. If firms wish to move down
their learning curves, they may sell output at prices where currentmarginal- 20.-
costs are less than current marginal revenues. If higher output now reduces
costs of production later, then the solution to a firm's dynamic optimization
problem is to set current marginal cost equal to the sum of current marginal
revenue plus the present value of the indirect saving on future production
costs. Spence (1981) has analyzed this problem for the closed economy, and
Krugman (1982) has extended the analysis to the case of international com-
petition.
The other explanations for dumping we have labelled the "traditional"
view. In textbos, dumping is explained as price discrimination between
national markets by foreign producers facing a price elasticity of demand in the
export market that exceeds the price elasticity of demand in their own martet.25
Permitting foreign suppliers to discriminate in favor of domestic consumers
reduces the surplus captured by domestic rivals but by less than the increase in
the surplus captured by domestic consumers. ]mestic competitors havean incen-
tive to lobby for restrictions on price discrimination by foreign suppliers,
while policymakers se&ing to maximize national welfare have an incentive to
Alimitation of the textbook explanation of dumping as monopolistic
price discrimination is that different price elasticities of demand are assumed
to arise arbitrarily from taste differences among residents of home and foreign
countries. As Brander and Krugman (1981) note, this explanation provides little
guidance as to instances when we should expect to observe dumping rather than
reverse dumping or no price discrimination at all.
We proceed by analyzing the textbock explanation for dumping as price
discrimination in international trade. However, instead of assuming arbitrary
differences in demand, we emphasize systematic differences in supply.—21—
Specifically, we focus on aspects of market structure and conduct which canlead
to price discrimination in favor of overseas customers. To highlight these fac-
tors, we assume, until explicitly stated to the contrary, that commoditydemands
in the home and foreign countries are identical. Thus, dumping cannot arise
from arbitrary differences in tastes. To further simplify the exposition, we
assume throughout the theoretical analysis that the common price elasticityof
demand is constant and exceeds one in absolute value.
We analyze a model made up of two regions (or "countries"): the
importingand exporting, or domestic and foreign, countries. As the nomencla-
ture suggests, the model does not admit of trade—pattern reversals or two—way
trade in identical products. It is necessary to rule out re—exports by assump-
tion, for in their presence price discrimination (net of transport costs) is
impossible. Anyoneof several restrictions is sufficient to preclude this
possibility; for simplicity we assume that the exporting country's market iB
protected by prohibitive trade restrictions. We consider a number of specific
market structures under which dumping may occur. Market structure is taken as
parametric in that entry and exit are not permitted. Models of dumping as entry
deterrence are considered in Eichengreen (1982), but such considerations are
omitted here as not being essential to a relatively short run analysis of the
steel industry.
The implication of the analysis is the same in each case: dumping will
occur when firms producing for sale to customers in the importing countryfind
it relatively difficult to restrict output to the joint—profit—maximizing level.
The incidence of dumping will depend on the number of firms producing for each
national market, their costs, their market shares, and the degree to which they
recognize and exploit their mutual dependence.— 22—
Assume initially that a homogeneous commodity Z is produced at home
and abroad by identical single—product firms, subject to a fixed cost F anda
constant variable cost c
Ct =F+c(y)
(1) =F+c*(x+4)
C (ce) is total cost of domestic (foreign) firms.27 Asterisksdenote foreign
values throughout.y is domestic firm £ 's production for the domestic market,
and X1andx are foreign firm i's production for the domestic and foreign
markets, respectively. The constant variable cost assumption is dispensible,
but it makes for expository simplicity. Its realism is addressed below.
The industry in each country is comprised of a small number of oligopo—
listic rivals. Initially, we assume that all such firms abide by the Cournot
rule, setting quantities under the assumption that rivals' supplies to each
market are fixed. There are a variety of richer strategies available to the
firm, but this assumption provides a reasonable starting point. Here and below,
we consistently assume that second order and stability conditions are satisfied.
Each firm maximizes profits n(ir*) subject to its rivals' behavior. It is
possible that firms owned or operated by government agencies pursue other objec-
tives, but we restrict our attention here to the implications of profit maximi-
zation. For a representative foreign firm:
=p(z)x
+ p*(z*)x! -c!(x.+x!)-F (2)
k m
where z is total supply to the domestic market (z = x + y,) and
i=1— 23-.
Ic
z is total supply to the foreign maiket (z* = x*) There are Ic foreign
i=1
firms and rn—k domestic firms. p and p are the domestic and foreign prices
of Z. 1r/3ximpliesthat:
(p*/c)(x*/z*) =
wherec =—L . isthe price elasticity of market demand. Multiplying by
dp z




where c* = —c is the share-weighted average of the variable costs of
i=1
IcX 2
foreign firms, and H* =( 4-)isthe Herfindahl Index of foreign sales con-
i=1
centration.28 Since the markup over marginal cost is an increasing function of
(5) *c-He




Here c is a share-weighted average of variable costs for firmsselling to the
domestic market, and H is the Herfindahl Index of domestic salesconcentration,
defined over both domestic and foreign firms. Note that theHerfindahl Index
measures the extent to which sales to customers in a givencountry (as distinct
from production by firms located in that country)are concentrated among a small
number of rivals. The first term in (6) indicates thatprice will be lower in
the market where on average suppliers producesubject to lower variable costs.
The second term in (6) indicates that the domestic price/costratio will be
lower than the foreign one when the domestic market is lessconcentrated than
the foreign market as measured by the Herfindahi Index. Thegreater the degree
of concentration in sales, the closer the oligopolistsare able to approach the
joint-profit—maximizing solution.
The intuition for this result is apparent. Equation (3), from which
the dumping ratio is derived, indicates that the firm setsperceived marginal
revenue equal to marginal cost. Perceived marginal revenue depends notonly on
market price and market elasticity of demand but in additionon the individual
firm's market share. A smaller market share increases theelasticity of the
firm's perceived marginal revenue function byreducing its loss of revenue on
inframarginal sales.
A special case is where all firms produce subject to identicalcosts.
In this case, all firms selling in a particular market haveidentical market
shares, and the Herfindahi Index is simply that number of firms raised to the
second power. Thimping occurs when more firms produce for saleto the domestic—25—
market than to the foreign one, which is necessarily the case in this instance
given our other assumptions. The sales of each domestic firm are z/m, so pro-
fits of each firm are [p(z)—c]z/m —F.Thus, while our model focuses on the
price discrimination definition of dumping, it is compatable with the sales
below cost criterion analyzed by Ethier (1982) and others, for it is entirely
possible in our model for profits to be negative during periods of depressed
demand.
It is straightforward to generalize the dumping ratio to allow firms to
anticipate the reactions of rivals and to introduce a competitive fringe in each










where there are n—k members of the foreign competitive fringe and w-s mem-









The first order condition is:
3p 3zn 3x.w 3y
p+y _._..(____+-__.+ E (9)
8z 9y1=1 3yqr—26—
We assume that oligolopolists neglect the reaction of fringe firms
w 3y n 3x
(z —--=z 0)and that members of the fringe act as price takers,
u=s+1 3q &k+1 3Yq
setting price equal to marginal cost. For algebraic simplicity, we assume that
each firm's conjecture about the reaction of each rival is identical.29
Multiplying by (or by x1/z) and summing over firms producing for the
domestic market yields an expression that can be rearranged to yield:
(10)
c c —H(1+6)
where H is the truncated Herfindahl Index for the k +a—nlargest firms
selling to the domestic maitet, and 6 is the conjectural variation on rivals'
domestic sales.3° The dumping ratio is:
_ E —H(1+6)
(ii)
P C c-cj*(1 + 6*)
where H* is the truncated Herfindahi Index for foreign firms, defined over
shares of foreign sales, and 6* is the conjectural variation on foreign rivals'
foreign sales. Thus, the dumping ratio depends on costs, on maitet demand
elasticities, and on (truncated) Herfindahl Indices, now adjusted for conjec-
tural variations. The dumping ratio is a decreasing function of the conjectural
variation in the domestic market, since the larger the conjectural variation,
the greater the perceived threat of retaliation by rivals to an individual
firm's price reduction.
It is a small step to derive the analogous expression when domestic and—27—
foreignoutputs are imperfect substitutes. Letp'=p'(y,p),wherep' is the
price of home output in the domestic market, and p is the price of foreign
output in the domestic market. For simplicity of exposition, we retain the
assumption that the foreign market is closed to imports; thus '= p*(x*).It
will be necessary to consider two price ratios. inote the market share of the
domestic fringe e.Eachdomestic oligopolist maximizes the expression:
=p'(y,p)y—c(y)—F (8')
The first order condition is:
B3y W3ir
p'+y (1__+ + +L2' Lv.— = (s') q3Y
3Yq q q
For algebraic simplicity, we again assume that each domestic oligopolist's con-
jecture about the reaction of each domestic rival is identical. It is con-
venient to impose two further assumptions: that each domestic oligopolist makes
thesame conjecture about the response of foreign suppliers to a percentage
change in its output (= —p--- is the sameforall q) ,andthat each domes—
aYq
tic oligopolist forms the sameestimate of the ratio of cross— to own—price
elasticities in the demand for its output (that is, each makes the same estimate
p of a =—— ).Recallingthat oligopolists neglect the fringe' reaction
ap p'
( 1-= 0)and that members of thefringe act asprice takers, multiplying
us+1 Yq
y





where a =(1— ,c'is the share—weighted average of variable costs for
domestic firms, and c 'isthe elasticity of demand for the domestic good, as
distinct from the elasticity of demand for the foreign good (still denoted c)
His the truncated Herfindahi Index for the s—n largest domestic firms, and
6 is now the conjectural variation on domestic rivals' behavior. Making the
same assumptions about foreign firms, the dumping ratio is:
=cc(l +a*)—H(1+6*)
(ii')
p c c -i(i
+6*)
and the ratio of imported to domestic steel prices is:
p =c e'(l +a)—H(1
+6) (ii") ' c'c(1 +a)—H(1+6*)
where H* (H**) is the truncated Herfindahl Index defined over shares of sales of
the k largest foreign firms in the domestic (foreign) maxtet. Again, the
dumping ratio depends on (truncated) Herfindahl Indices adjusted for conjectural
variations. The ratio p/p' is a decreasing function of the conjectural
variation in the domestic market, since the larger the conjectural variation,
the greater the extent of retaliation anticipated by firms contemplating a price
reduction. Now however, the dumping ratio also depends on market demand elasti-
cities adjusted for the effects of a •areflects foreign firms' estimates
of the substitutability of national outputs x and foreign firms' conjectureson their domestic rivals reactions to import price cuts 'V.Thelarger foreign
firm8'conjectureson the reaction of domestic firms to an import price reduc-
tion, the less the temptation to cut prices.
The welfare effects of antidumping actions are illustrated in Figure
1, with zero subscripts denoting initial prices and quantities. We consider the
case where domestic and foreign outputs are imperfect substitutes for one
another and analyze the effects of an antidumping action which effectivelypla-
ces a floor p1 beneath the price of imports. Income effectsare neglected
throughout. Before any antidumping action, there is a distortion in each maiket
due to the presence of imperfect competition. When the price of the importable
is raised fromp0 to p1, rents accruing to foreign suppliers change by areas
E—B. E-Bmaybe positive, in part since foreign producers were incapable pre-
viously of restricting output to joint-profit—maximizing levels. Even in this
case, however, foreigners may object to antiduinping initiatives, since under the
assumptions of the model any one foreign producer expects to increase its pro-
fits by expanding supply and driving down prices. It is possible for E—B to be
negative if P1-p0 is large and if the demand for imports isdepressed suf-
ficiently below the joint—profit—maximizing level.
The rise in the price of imports shifts the demand curve for domestic
output to the right. However, due to our assumption of a constant demand
elasticity and no change in firms' conjectures, domestic producers do not raise
prices in response to the shift in domestic demand. In this model, if domestic
rents are zero initially, they remain zero. In this case import restraints do
not increase the profitability of domestic production, and domestic producers
derive little if any benefit from the imposition of antidumping duties or simi-









Theimplications for domestic consumers are straightforward.
Consumers suffer a loss of surplus in the market for x amounting toareas C+E.
Since the marginal utility of y equals the price consumerspay, there is rio
changein consumer surplus in the market for domestic steel.
To measure the welfare loss associated with an antidunping action
which raises the price of x from
P0to p1, we employ Harberger's (1974) standard
formula —W =l/2T.Q.+ETAQ.,whereEW is the change in welfare, Q.isthe 1 111 1
quantitydemanded, and T. is the distortion due to the divergence ofprice from
marginal cost. The first terminthis summation approximates area C in the top
panel of Figure 1. approximates areas F+G—B. B is the extra loss in the
market for x due to the presence of a previous distortion also working to
restrict demand. F+G is the welfare gain in the market fory, since raising the
price of imports stimulates demand for another good whose production is
depressed by the presence of second distortion. Thus, for the welfare loss we
have the expression —w= (B+C)—(F+G).
IV. Some Numerical Estimates
In this section, we calibrate the model of Section III in order to
illustrate how the extent of dumping and the TPM's effects depend on the model's
parameters. We calibrate the model for 1979, the latest year for which the
necessary data is available and the TPM was in effect. Readers familiar with
previous efforts along these lines will note the resemblance of our approach to
those of Crandall (1981) and Tarr (1982a). Our framework differs from theirs,
however, in that we highlight the presence of imperfect competition.
One way to proceed is to estimate pricing equations with time series
data. The results of the previous section indicate that the dumping ratio
should be a function of the market demand elasticities, Herfindahl Indices, and—31—
conjectural variations. Using time series methods to estimate this relationship
is appealing, but in this instance there are a number of impediments to imple-
menting this approach. Consistent time series on the value and volume of pre-
cisely defined categories of European steel exports can be constructed only from
1960 or 1966. The small size of the sample is problematic when the pricing
equation is nonlinear, as is the case in Section III. A further difficulty is
that certain variables of interest, such as the conjectural variation, are
unobservable. While the use of proxies is feasible, it is unlikely in practice
to yield definitive conclusions. In preference to time series estimation, we
choose to examine what data are available and to use them as a basis for
calibrating the model. The parameter values irnp'sed are best thought of as
informed guesses of the relevant magnitudes. Given that our model is highly
simplified and our parameter values certainly are not above dispute, we would
prefer our estimates to be viewed as numerical illustrations of how the extent
of dumping and the TPM's effects depend on particular parameters.
A. Data
A number of sources provide information on the domestic and foreign
prices of steel products. However, there are difficult and well—known problems
in establishing a concordance between U.S. statistics and those of other
nations. In this section we examine data on the price of European steel exports
to the U.S. relative to the price of the same goods in Europe, since European
producers were among the exporters most heavily affected by U.S. trigger prices.
While official base prices for European steel products are readily available,
the prevalence of discounting in the European steel maiet renders them a poor
proxyfor transactions prices. We choose instead to examine unit value figureS
derivedfrominternational trade statistics. Thus, for the price of European— 32—
steel in Europe, we use unit values of intra—E.C, trade. By implication, we
neglect discounting by European producers in sales to their favored domestic
customers. Unit values are themselves imperfect proxies for transactions
prices; a number of authors have shown that changes in calculated unit values
tend to lag behind changes in transactions prices. While this problem should be
borne in mind, it is more important in other applications than when trade
figures are annual totals and when one set of unit values is deflated by
another.
Calculated unit values for European exports have been employed pre-
viously by Tarr (1979, 1982b) and Takacs (1982). However, their figures are not
appropriate for our purposes, since they do not distinguish European exports to
the U.S. from European exports bound for other destinations. Our figures for
unit values of European steel exports to the U.S. and intra—E.C. steel trade,
drawn from the E.C. 'a Analytical Tables of Foreign Trade, are available at a low
level of aggregation, permitting us to present statistics for relatively homoge-
neous product categories. For example, we consider only concrete reinforcing
bars,eliminating other bars from that category, and remove hot rolled sheet and
plate fromthe figures for sheet and plate less than 3mm. usedbyTarr and
Takacs.While product—mix effects may not be eliminated entirely, their
influence should be minimized by our use of narrow product catagories.
Table 6 presents the ratio of domestic to export prices for four cate-
gories of European steel products: rails, wire rod, concrete reinforcing bars
and cold rolled sheet. The dumping ratios exhibit a striking degree of
variation. Regressing the unit value of exports destined for the U.S. on a
constant term and the intra—E.C. export unit value leads in every case to rejec-
tion of the joint hypothesis of a zero constant and a slope coefficient ofTable 6
Relative Price of European Steel Exports to U.S.
("Thmestic" Unit Value Relative toExport Unit Value)
Concrete Cold
b Reinforcing






1966 .942 1.079 1.121 1.403 1967 .779 1.035 1.171 1.290
1968 .806 1.082 1.099 1.259 1969 .731 1.064 1.349 1.279 1970 .812 1.000 1.290 1.297
1971 .902 1.086 1.239 1.159 1972 1.077 1.083 1.144 1.242
1973 1.529 1.176 1.066 1.497
1974 .839 .877 1.027 .948 1975 .956 .895 .833 1.185 1976 1.085 1.108 1.040 1.218
1977 1.104 1.256 1.179 1.287 1978 1.183 1.104 1.066 1.287
1979 1.161 1.027 1.212 1.318 1980 1.079 .957 na 1.425
4-._.,_t_.t_ .—.
a.NIME 7316.14, 7316.16
b. NIMEXE 7310.11, 7363.21,7373.23, 7373.24, 7373.25, 7373.26, 7373.29
c. NIMEXE 7310.13
d.NIXE 7313.43, 7313.45, 7313.47, 7313.49,7313.50, 7313.92, 7365.55,
7365.81, 7375.63, 7375.64,7375.69, 7375.83, 7375.84, 7375.89
Note: Values greater than one indicateprice discrimination in favor of the
U.S.
Source: E.C., Analytical Tables ofForeign Trade (various issues).—33—
unity.31Interestingly, the dumping ratios in Table 6 are similar to the price
differentials of up to 40 per cent reported by Kravis and Lipsey (1977) for
German—American trade in bars and in tube and pipe fittings.
B. Dumping Ratios
Our calculated dumping ratios will differ greatly depending on whether
U.S. and imported steel products are treated as perfect or imperfect substitu-
tes. Evidence on this issue is far from conclusive. Many carbon steel products
appear undifferentiated —concretereinforcing bars being perhaps the best
instance in our sample. At the same time, as noted in Section II, subtle
quality differences are cited frequently in studies of import penetration. The
imperfect substitutes assumption is supported by all recent empirical studies,
so we adopt it here.




C CC - H*x*(1+*)
In contrast to (ii'), marcet demand elasticities(ce) are allowed to differ,
and we consider standard Herfindahi Indices. For price elasticities of demand,
we draw on worc by Stone (1979). For iron and steel semi—manufactures, Stone
reports import demand elasticities of 2.83 and 1.66 for the U.S. and E.C.
respectively. We use 1.66 as the maiket demand elasticity for Europe and 2.83
asthe own—price elasticity of demand in U.S. import demand functions.
In constructing Herfindahl Indices, we treat each national European
industry as a joint—profit maximizer. While it is a drastic simplification, we
impose this assumption in recognition of the extent of nationalization and per——34—
vasive government involvement in the various national industries. Thus, the
Herfindahl Indices measure the extent to which sales by Europeanproducers,
either to the U.S. ma&et or within the E.C., are concentratednationally. For
1979 values for H and H, calculated as in Table 6 and weightedby product
shares are .335 and .215 respectively. Relaxing the assumption ofjoint profit
maximization would tend to lower the Herfindahl indices and reduce theprice—
cost margins. For the conjectural variations, we consider the Cournot and
constant market share values of zero and unity. a* is calibrated at 0 and
—0.1. In the absence of contrary evidence, we set c/c to tounity.
The dumping ratios for 1979 generated by equation (12) arepresented in
Table 7. For the parameter values considered, the dumping ratio falls within
the range of values appearing in Table 6.
C. The TPM's Effects
For purposes of our calculations, it is necessary to consider the
supply response of Japan and other exporting nations against whom the TPM was
not primarily directed. If, for example, trigger prices restrictexports by the
E.C. and other suppliers whose costs are high relative to those inJapan, the
incipient change in U.S. import prices may elicit increased exports bysuppliers
whose costs are relatively low. The effects will be smaller thelarger the
supply response of the so—called "restrained suppliers," to use the terminology
of Tarr (1982a).32 In our view, while restrainedsuppliers possessed con-
siderable excess capacity both prior to and in the period of theTPM, they
resisted the temptation to increaseexports to the U.S. Hence, we assume no
supply response by restrained suppliers to the imposition of trigger prices. In
the welfare calculations that follow, we treat theirsupply curves as inelastic
and their maiets as undistorted. In this and other respects, ouranalysis isTable 7




















In what follows, we distinguish three categories of steel:steel pro-
duced domestically, steel imported from Europe, and steel imported from other
countries. Each of our demand functions has their three respective prices as
arguments. As a first approximation, we treat foreign producers other than
European as restrained suppliers.
We model the TPM as simply placing a floor under the price of U.S.
imports at the 1979 average trigger price of $350 per net ton. Thus, we neglect
problems of non—compliance and related complications discussed in Section II.
To quantify the TPN's effects, we use equations such as (12) to calculate the
prices that would have obtained in the mechanism's absence. To do so, it is
necessary to select specific values for c and c' .Theratio of domestic to
foreign costs is a fiercely debated issue which cannot be resolved here; we set
c/c' equal to 1.2, and for upper and lower bounds we calibrate c at $230 and
$290 per net ton.33 We do not distintuish U.S. exports from domestic sales.
U.S. exports are small in volume and value; adding this distinction would only
modify our measures in minor ways at the cost of further complexity. In the
absence of precise estimates, we set the own—price elasticity of demand for
domestic steel to unity and all cross-price elasticities to half the value of
own-price elasticities, thereby insuring that demands are homogeneous of degree
zero in prices. Given the manner in which U.S. mill list prices appear to have
hovered around trigger prices, we set the price of domestic steel to $350 per
net ton.
The results of our numerical calculations are shown in Table 8 for the
cases where the TPM would be binding. As indicated above, the magnitude of the









Illustrative Effects of the TPN, 1979
(in $ million)
Transfer










5985.6 —853.0 +6396.0 —87.7 53O.3
c230 6=1
+4222.3 —657.4 46OO.1 —135.2 +414.8
c=230 6=0 o-O.1
+3617.5 —616.2 +4001.0 —140.1 +372.8
-
l931.4 —380.1 +2205.5 —119.8 +225.8
-= 0 =
—29.7 —240.2 49.O —27.5 +189.0
c=290 6=1
—5.3 —51.8—36—
initial distortion in domestic markets Is large relative to the rise in import
prices caused by the TPM. In cases (1) through (4), the domestic distortion is
large and the welfare effects are easily Interpreted. European producers suffer
a loss of surplus, while U.S. producers and foreign restrained suppliers receive
additional rents. Since the markup charged by domestic producers is relatively
large, so is the transfer they receive. Thus, domestic producers receive the
largest portion of the incremental rents. The estimated efficiency gainranges
from $1931.4 million to $5985.6 million.
When the domestic distortion is relatively small, in cases (5) and
(6), the sign of the welfare effect is reversed. On balance, the loss tocon-
sumers outweighs the gain to producers. Foreign firmscapturethe largest share
of transfers to producers, and there is an overall loss of efficiency which
ranges from $5.3 million to $29.7 milion. These effects resemble what we
referred to in Section III as the standard textbock case.
The unusual welfare effects in cases (1) through (4) provide a graphic
illustration of the theory of the second best: when distortions in the market
for domestic steel are severe relative to distortions in the market for imports,
it is possible to reduce the deadweight loss by adding distortions on the import
side. Having mentioned this possibility compels us to close on a cautionary
note. If antidumping action can be welfare-improving because of distortions in
domestic markets, first—best policies addressed at those domestic distortions
are still to be preferred. In our case, promoting competition can alleviate the
domestic distortion without causing any loss on the import side.
Although we have attempted to extend simple welfare calculations in a
number of directions, our model ultimately remains partial equilibrium. We have
already seen how effects that are usually dismissed as second-order can be cru——37-
ciallyimportant in an imperfectly competitive setting. Among the effects we
have suppressed are distortions in factor maicets, changes in the extent of
collusion, dangers of foreign retaliation, and rent—seeking by domestic factors
of production; this last possibility, for example, greatly diminishes the like-
lihood that the additional distortion will enhance welfare. Many of these
extensionsare readily incorporated into our framewoxk. Even without these
complications, however, our analysis suggests that governments must be able to
estimate a relatively large number of parameters with considerable accuracy
beforethey can be assured that this form of intervention is welfare-improving.
V. Concluding Renia&s
In this paper, we have analyzed dumping and U.S. antidumping policy
from a number of different perspectives. While attempting to address a broad
rangeofquestions in a relatively few pages, we recognize that each of these
issues warrants more extensive treatment. The first sections of the paper ana-
lyze the evolution of U.S. antiduxnping policy and the design of the Trigger
Price Mechanism. To understand the evolution of antiduraping policy, we have
argued, it is necessary to analyze how policy is adapted in response to politi-
cal pressures; the TPM provides a dramatic illustration of these considerations.
From the point of view of its architects, who felt pressure from all sides, the
TPM was a political masterpiece. Economically, it was perhaps less masterful;
its exponents may have incompletely anticipated how administered protection
could distort established patterns of trade and production. An analysis of the
TF demonstrates also how administrative decisions on seemingly minor points —
suchas the exchange rate to use in computing costs —canhave major economic
effects.
The latter sections of the paper use theoretical models to explain the—38—
sources of dumping and to illustrate the magnitude of its effects. The models
of most relevance to the practices currently at issue in the steel industry seem
to us models of oligopolistic rivalry in imperfectly competitive, segmented
maiets. Basing our analysis on the traditional economic definition of dumping
as price discrimination in international trade, we have attempted to identify a
number of crucial variables upon which the incidence of dumping will depend: the
number of firms producing for each national market,theircosts, their market
shares, and the extent to which they recognize and exploit their mutual depen-
dence. Finally, we have used these models of imperfect competition to
illustrate how the size of the dumping ratio and the incidence of the TPM depend
on certain crucial parameter values. Much rexaains to be done to establish the
generality of our framework, but we hope at least that we have stimulated some
of our readers to think along these lines.—39—
Footnotes
1. In this paper we are concerned solely with dumping and U.S.antidumping
policies. We do not discuss countervailing duties imposed in response to
foreign government subsidization of exports. However, see footnote 25
below.
2. Antidumping measures also were included in the Revenue Act of1916, whose
provisions unfortunately proved difficult to administer.
3.U.S. Senate (1934) discusses the origins of the Act.
4. The immediate impetus for the change was a complaint that Canadian sulfur
was being sold in both U.S. and Canadian markets at prices below costs.
The 1974 Act also authorized the Treasury to base constructed value calcu-
lations on data for comparable market economies when production costs in
state—controlled economies proved difficult to measure.
5. See for example Crandall (1978, 1980), U.S. GAO (1979), and Kawahito
(1981).
6. Section 206(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 defined constructedvalue as the
sumof(i) "The cost of materials...and of fabrication or otherprocessing
.at a time preceding the date of exportation of the merchandise under
consideration which would ordinarily permit the production of thatpar-
ticular merchandise in the ordinary course of business." (2) "An amount
for general expenses. ..notless than ten per cent of material and of fabri-
cation costs." (3) "An amount for profit not less than eightper cent of
the sum of material and fabrication costs and general expenses." (4) "The
cost of all containers and coverings...and all otherexpenses incidental to
placing the merchandise .. .incondition. ..readyfor shipnent to the U.S."
7. The debate over VRAs is recounted by Takacs (1976), Nueller and Kawahito-40-
(1979), and Adams and Dirlam (1980).
8. In the words of its architects, the system was to "expedite relieffrom
unfair import competition, but to do so In a manner which would notpreclude
competition in the U.S. market." See Solomon (1977),p. 8.
9.Treasurymust acquire sufficient information upon which to base a deter-
mination within 75 days, and the complaintant must waive his right to
verify the exporter's submission. In a related action, responsibility for
enforcing U.S. antiduxnping statutes was transferred from Treasury to
Commerce.
10. In practice, the constructed value provisions do notappear to have been
invoked on these grounds.
11. American Importers Association (1979), p.21; Sato and Hodin (1982),p. 37.
12.U.S. Department of Commerce (1980), p. 5.
13. Treasury News (July 20, 1980), p. 3.
14.Ibid. If the yield ratio is 80 per cent, the other 20per cent is scrap.
A credit in the amountofthe value of the scrap was applied to production
costestimates for finished steel. The yield credit was raised in 19781V
on the grounds that Japanese scrap was actually a higher valued secondary
material.
15. U.S. Department of Commerce (1980),p. 4.
16.Weneglect feedba& from trigger prices to exchange rates, and from there
todomestic costs. The assumption that such feedback was negligible is
crucial to our interpretation of Table 2. On these effects, see
Eichengreen (1 981 ,1983).
17.Steel Tripartite Committee (1979), p. 8.
18. !1ueller (1980), p. 1.—41—
19.DirlamandMueller (1981), P. 13.
20. McCorrnack (1981), p. 313. See also American Iron and Steel Institute
(1978).
21. See Treasury News(April13,1978).
22. For a recent analysis, see U.S. General Accounting Office (1980),chapter
3,andU.S. GAO (1981), chapter 3.Similarpoints were made some years ago
by Jondrow etal. (1976).
23.U.S.GAO (1980), p. 21. SeeDirlamand Mueller (1981) and Walter (1982)
for discussions of these allegations.
24. See United States versus Mitsui (1982).
25. See for example Caves and Jones (1973), pp.212—214, or Cordon (1974),
pp.235—247.
26. This is not to imply that there is no role forpolicy toward industries
facingimport competition. For analyses of the arguments for adjusnent
assistance, see Bhagwati (1982).
27. It would be straightforward to introduce production and export subsidies
atthis point. However, as noted above, we feel that the subsidyquestion
is logically distinct from the issues analyzed here, so we makeno attempt
to incorporate it into our model. For a similar approach toanalyzing sub-
sidies, see Brander and Spencer (1982). It would also be straightforward
to introduce transport costs. Although we do not treat such costsexpli-
citly, they can be thought of as a component of c .Seealso Brander
(1981) and Brander and Krugman (1981).
28. See Rader (1972), nsby and Willig (1979) and, foran elegant application
to the Japanese steel industry, Yamawaki(1982).—42—
k dx Sdyr
29. In other words, we assumeE —= Z—forall i ,q,andr
1=1 dYqq7r dyq
Dixit and Stern (1982) argue that this assumption captures the case where
oligopolists are in the industry on broadly equal terms.
30. If the oligopolists take fringe firms' reactions into account, then we get
the standard Herfindahi Index in place of the truncated index. The conjec-
tural variation is the firm's estimate of the slope of rivals' reaction
functions. It can be heuristically interpreted as the perceived probabi-
lity of retaliation. Thus,iS =0is the Cournot case, and 'S =1is the
case where each firm believes that other firms will try to preserve market
shares. Cases of 'S < 0 ,whileconceivable, are not considered here.
Firms' conjectures are taken as constant throughout. Modeling conjectures
as rational makes it difficult to characterize industry equilibrium, so we
follow standard practice by taking conjectural variations as exogenous. On
rational conjectural variations, see citations in Kamien and Schwartz
(1981).
31. Such tests of the "law of one price" are surveyed by Crouhy-Veyrac. Crouhy,
and Melitz (1982).
32. Were national outputs perfect substitutes and marketimperfectionsabsent,
one could visualize a scenario in which U.S. antidumping policy admi-
nistered under the TPM caused European steel formerly destined for the U.S.
to be diverted to Japanese markets or to remain in Europe and a
corresponding quantity of Japanese production to be diverted to the U.S.
In fact, allegations of this type of activity on part of European and
Japanese producers have recently been made by the U.S. industry.
neglecting transport costs, in this case U.S. antidumping policies would—43—
have no efficiency or distributional effects. When steel products produced
in different countries are imperfect substitutes, the analysis is more
complicated but the implication is the same.
33.Muellerand Kawahito (1978) review the available evidence and present esti-.
mates of their own. For example, for 1976 their estimate of the ratio of
European to U.S. costs is 1.17. In this paper we present no evidence on
the constancy of variable cost. Since Takacs (1976) finds marginal costs
to be slightly declining, while others such as Crandall (1981) treat them
as rising, this seems to be a judicious conaproraise. Our estimates of c
for 1979 are constructed by adjusting Mueller and Kawahito's figure of $205
in 1976 forthe change inprices of industrial goods. We think of these
figuresasincluding costs of variable labor, coal, fuel oil, natural gas,
electricity, iron ore and scrap, plus transportation and related expenses.
For a number of reasons, including the fact that their calculations exclude
the U.K., there is reason to treat $230 as a lower bound; we use $290 as an
upper bound. We recognize, however that we have suppressed the large cost
differentials that exist among producers in a given location.—44—
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